MM#254--Broken Arrow 2--The Damascus Incident

Welcome to the Theory to Action podcast, where we examine the timeless treasures of wisdom from the great books in less time, to help you take action immediately and ultimately to create and lead a flourishing life. Now here's your host, david Kaiser.

Hello, I am David and welcome back to another Mojo Minute and, keeping with our new tradition, let's jump right into our first book. On September 18th 1980 at 6 30 in the evening, senior airman David F Powell and airman Jeffrey L Plumb walked into the silo at launch complex 374-7 a few miles north of Damak, damascus, arkansas. They were planning to do a routine maintenance procedure on a Titan II missile. They had spent countless hours underground at complexes like this one, but no matter how many times they entered the silo, the Titan II always looked impressive. It was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile ever built by the United States 10 feet in diameter, 103 feet tall, roughly the height of a nine-story building. It had an aluminum skin with a matte finish in the US Air Force painted and big letters down the side. The nose cone on the top of the Titan II was deep black and inside it sat a. And inside it sat a W 53 thermo nuclear warhead, the most powerful weapon ever carried by an American missile. The warhead had yield had a yield of nine megatons, about three times the explosive force of all the bombs dropped during the Second World War, including both atomic bombs. Day or night, when it were spring, the silo always felt the same it was eerily quiet and a mercury vapor lights on the walls bade the missile in a bright white glow. When you open the door on a lower level and stepped into the launch duct, the Titan II loomed over you like an immense black-tipped silver bullet, loaded in a concrete gun barrel, primed, cocked, ready to go and pointed at the sky. The missile was designed to launch within a minute and hit a target as far as 6000 miles away. In order to do that, the Titan II relied upon a pair of liquid propellants, a rocket fuel and an oxidizer that were hyper-golic. The moment they came into contact with each other, they instantly and forcefully ignite. The missile had two stages and inside both of them, an oxidizer tank rested on the top of a fuel tank With pipes leading down to an engine. Stage 1, which extended about 70 feet upward from the bottom of the missile, contained about 85,000 pounds of fuel and 163,000 pounds of oxidizer. Stage 2, the upper section where the warhead sat, was smaller and held about one fourth of those amounts. If the missile were launched, fuel and oxidizer would flow through stage 1 pipes, mixed inside the combustion chambers of the engine, catch on fire and emit hot gases and send almost half a million pounds of thrust through the supersonic convergent divergent nozzles beneath it. In a few minutes the Titan II would be 50 miles off the ground. And this wonderful quote comes to us from a book written by Eric Schlosser titled command and control nuclear weapons the Damascus accident in the illusion of safety Fantastic book. I highly recommend it. And For now let's go back to the story by going back to the book how and plum were missile repairmen. They belong to propellant transfer system team a of the 308th strategic missile wing, whose headquarters was about an hour away or so at Little Rock Air Force Base. They have been called to the site that day because of a warning light that had signaled that pressure was low in the stage to Oxidizer tank. If the pressure fell too low, the oxidizer wouldn't flow smoothly to the engine. A Quote low light couldn't mean a serious problem. I rupture a leak, but it's far more likely that a slight change in the temperature. I lowered the pressure inside the tank. Air conditioning units in the silo were supposed to keep the missile cooled to about 60 degrees. If pow and plum didn't find any leaks, they simply unscrew the cap on the oxidizer tank and add more nitrogen gas. Nitrogen maintained a steady pressure on the liquid inside, pushing downward. It was a simple, mundane task, like putting air in your tires before a long drive. Pow had served on the pts team, that's the propellant transfer team or the propellant transfer system. Pow had served on the pts team for almost three years and knew the hazards of the Titan 2. During his first visit to a launch complex, an oxidizer leak created a toxic cloud that shut down operations for three days. It was a 21 year old, proud Hillbilly from rural Kentucky who loved the job and playing. To reenlist at the end of the year. Plum had been with the 308th for just nine months. He wasn't qualified to do this sort of missile maintenance or to handle these propellants. Accompanying pow and watching everything that pow did was what considered Plum. That was considered Plum's OJT on his on-the-job training. Plum was 19 and raised in suburban Detroit. Okay, let's recap some of the facts of what is going on here. So at 6 30 pm on September 18th the missile repairmen discovered a possible fuel leak. But we have some very young men handling this nuclear weapon and, frankly, for that matter, working in and around nuclear warheads. So is the hair on the back of your neck standing up right now. Yes, this is all happening in 1980. So the military is had, by this time, over 30 years of dealing and working with nuclear materials. Right, if you listen to our last podcast, you'll know that we had an incident in the 1950s and, frankly, we've had many incidences throughout our whole time with nuclear weapons. From the 1950s to the 1980s is the time period we're talking about now. So you would think there'd be some vast experience with these nuclear weapons, but for 19 and 20 year olds to be doing these types of jobs, well, it seems to not be great oversight. That all being said, let's go back to the book. The stage two oxidizer pressure cap was about two thirds of the way up the missile. In order to reach it, pow and Plum had to walk across a retractable steel platform that extended from the silo wall. The tall hollow cylinder in which the Titan II stood was enclosed by another concrete cylinder with nine interior levels housing equipment. Level one was near the top of the missile level nine, about 20 feet beneath the missile. The steel work platforms folded down from the walls hydraulically. Each one had a stiff rubber edge to prevent the Titan II from getting scratched, while keeping the gap between the platform and the missile as narrow as possible. The airmen entered the launch duct at level two. Far above their heads was a concrete silo door. It was supposed to protect the missile from the wind, in the rain, in the effects of a nuclear weapon detonating nearby. The door weighed 740 tons. Far below the men, beneath the Titan II, a concrete flame deflector shaped like a W was installed to guide the hot gases downward at launch, then upward through exhaust vents and out of the silo. The missile stood on a thrust mount, a steel ring at level seven that weighed about 26,000 pounds. The thrust mount was attached to the walls by large springs so that the Titan II could ride out a nuclear attack, bounce instead of break, and then take off. In addition to the W3 warhead, a few hundred thousand pounds of propellants, many other things in the silo could detonate. Electro explosive devices were used after ignition to free the missile from the thrust mount separating stage two from stage one and release the nose cone. The missile also housed numerous small rocket engines with flammable solid fuel to adjust the pitch and the roll of the warhead. Mid-flight the Titan II launch complex had been carefully designed to minimize the risk of having so many flammables and explosives within it. Fire detectors, fire suppression systems, toxic vapor detectors and decontamination showers were scattered throughout the nine levels of the silo. These safety devices were bolstered by strict safety rules. Whenever a PTS team member put on a reef go RFHCO, he had to be accompanied by someone else in a reef go, with two other people waiting as backup, ready to put on their suits. Every Category 1 task had to be performed according to a standardized checklist which the team chief usually read aloud over the radio communication network. There was one way to do everything, in only one way Technical order 21M-LGM25C-2-12. Figure 218 told PAL and PLOM exactly what to do. As they stood on the platform near the missile Step 4, the PTS team chief said over the radio Remove airborne disconnect pressure cap. Roger. Pal replied caution when complying with Step 4, do not exceed 164 pounds of torque. Over-torque may result in damage to the missile skin. Roger, as PAL used a socket wrench to unscrew the pressure cap, the socket fell off. It struck the platform and bounced. Pal grabbed for it but missed. Pal watched the 9-pound socket slip through the narrow gap between the platform and the missile, fall about 70 feet, hit the thrust mount and then ricochet off the Titan II. It seemed to happen in slow motion. A moment later, fuel sprayed from a hole in the missile like water from a garden hose. Oh man, plom thought that is not good. That is not good indeed. Like I said, this book is a fascinating look at how our US military handles our nuclear arsenal. I would urge you to check it out. But to fast forward. Early on the morning of Friday September 19th, two men, senior airmen David Lee Livingston and Sergeant Jeff Kennedy, entered the silo. They were part of the PTS investigative team to find out what was going on. To make a long story short, these two were ordered back out of the silo because of the indicators going off that vapors were coming from the silo. Then the team was ordered back in to turn on an exhaust fan to help with pulling the vapors out of the silo. At roughly 3 am on September 19th roughly three hours later, around 6 am, a huge explosion rocked the complex, ejecting the warhead from the missile silo to some 100 feet away from the launch complexes' entry gate. A hundred feet away, crazy. The warhead thankfully landed, but there was no explosion and, more importantly, it did not release any radioactive material. The incident caused significant damage to the silo and surrounding area, and it could have been much, much worse if the warhead had detonated. Sadly, very sadly, airman David Lee Livingston would later die at the hospital of his of injuries caused by the explosion. Sergeant Jeff Kennedy, unbelievably, was blown high in the air as well, but he landed against the chain link fence with his feet up in the air against the fence. Fortunately, he would live to tell this story, though he struggled with respiratory issues the rest of his life. It was estimated that the WF-53 nuclear warhead had a yield of 9 megatons, which is around 600 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II. Now, following the incident, the Air Force launched an investigation into the cause of the explosion, which ultimately found that the accident was due to human error. They also discovered several issues with the design of the missile, including the use of a volatile oxidizer and the lack of proper safety measures. The Damascus Titan missile explosion is a stark reminder of the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and the importance of following strict safety protocols. It could have easily resulted in a catastrophic nuclear disaster, and it also highlights the importance of investing in proper technology and training for our personnel involved in handling these extremely dangerous weapons and with military recruiting hitting the worst levels that we've ever seen in our volunteer force since 1973, this is becoming a much, much greater problem. So in today's mojo minute, the Damascus Titan missile explosion was a significant event that almost resulted in a nuclear catastrophe. Thankfully, the warhead did not release any radioactive material, but it does serve as a great reminder of the potential consequences of mishandling nuclear weapons and, with our military recruiting, which is in a deep, deep crisis, we currently need some real leadership from our military and our national leaders. Our country needs the best of its young men and women to serve and, sadly, our best young women and young men are looking at this military and saying no, thank you. They don't want to be part of any of the US military's social experiments. The Damascus incident and all broken arrow incidences will be a great reminder that we need young military members with great training to avoid these types of incidences and that to help detour any of our would be aggressors. Let's hope our country and its young people get the national leadership they so richly deserve.